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Despite recent declines, crime remains at the forefront of the problems facing society. In a Gallup poll
conducted earlier this year that asked respondents to
identify the most important problem facing their community, crime was the problem cited by 12 percent of
those surveyed, ranking second behind only education.
This anxiety about crime is not unjustified; an estimated
31 million crimes were committed in 1998, translating
to a victimization rate of roughly 11.5 crimes per 100
residents. Because crime is a significant concern, it is
important to understand the causes and consequences of
criminal activity. This thesis focuses on the relationship
between work and crime.
The remarkable decline in both violent and property
crime during the 1990s, coupled with improved job prospects for low-wage workers, has fueled speculation that
an improvement in economic conditions may be partly
responsible for the reduction in crime rates. The first
chapter of this disseltation, "Wages and Youth Anests,"
addresses the question of whether higher wages cause
teenagers to commit less crime. The second chapter,
"The Effect of Criminal Victimization on Employment
and Income," improves social cost calculations by calculating earnings losses suffered by victims of violent and
property crime. The third chapter, "efficient Bootstrapping for GMM" (written jointly with Bryan W. Brown
and Whitney K. Newey), focuses on inference for generalized method of moments estimators.

Chapter 1
Wages and Youth Arrests
Economists, criminologists, and policy makers have
long speculated on the relationship between economic
conditions and crime. Becker (1968) proposed that "a
rise in the income available in legal activities ... would
reduce the incentive to enter illegal activities and reduce
the numbers of offenses." Others have noted that the
relationship between the economy and crime also runs
in the opposite direction: high crime rates may inhibit
economic growth. For example, arrest and incarceration may lower the future earnings and employment
prospects of the offender, as suggested by previous
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studies. In addition, high levels of crime may encourage employers to change location or discourage new
business formation, contributing to slower economic
growth and a decline in regional employment prospects. The economy and crime may be linked through
other channels as well. In pmticular, property crime
rates have been shown to increase with economic
growth. Criminologists speculate that a strong economy increases the quantity and value of consumer
goods that can be stolen, thereby raising the returns to
property crime.
The low levels of crime in recent years have generated renewed interest in this relationship. The National
Crime Victimization Survey (NCVS) estimates that
there were approximately 31 million criminal victimizations in 1998, the fewest number recorded since
1973. This low level of crime is not the result of a
long, gradual decrease, but rather the result of a recent,
dramatic reduction in crime. From 1993 to 1998, violent crime victimization rates have fallen by roughly 27
percent, and property crime victimization rates have
seen an even sharper decrease of 32 percent. A variety
of explanations have been advanced to explain this
trend: increases in the number of police officers per
capita and changes in the law enforcement strategies
used by the police; growth in the number of criminals
incm'cerated; declines in the drug trade; rising private
expenditures on security guards and protection; and
improvements in the labor market prospects of young
workers.
The remarkable growth of the U.S. economy in
recent years has focused attention on this last explanation. Although many studies have examined the relationship between crime and the economy, these studies
have (for the most part) measured the effect of unemployment on the level of Clime. Such studies tend to
find that lower rates of unemployment are associated
with lower levels of crime but that the effect is moderate in magnitude (Freeman 1999). In addition, even the
largest estimate of the effect of unemployment on
crime is too small to explain much of the variation in
crime. The uncertain conclusions from this empirical
evidence on the relationship between economic condi-

7

tions and crime may be attributed, in part, to two factors. First, unemployment rates are only one measure
of the labor market prospects faced by criminals; potential earnings may also playa role in crime participation
decisions. Second, previous studies may fail to take
into account that high crime rates inhibit economic
growth. This failure may bias estimates of the responsiveness of crime to economic conditions.
This chapter uses exogenous variation in teenage
wages to address the question of whether youth crime is
responsive to economic conditions. I compare statelevel changes in the mean log wage of teenagers and the
change in teenage arrest rates between 1989 and 1992.
I employ an instrumental variables strategy that uses
the 1990 and 1991 increases in the federal minimum
wage as a source of exogenous vmiation in the wages of
teenagers. Two-stage least squares estimates show that
while arrest rates for violent crimes do not respond
strongly to changes in wages, participation in burglary,
motor vehicle theft, vandalism, and robbery is negatively related to market wages. Using these estimates,
elasticities of arrest rates with respect to market wages
are between -1 and -2 for property crime. These
results suggest that rising wages may account for as
much as 30 percent of the fall in youth arrest rates in
recent years.

Chapter 2
The Effect of Criminal Victimization on
Employment and Income
Despite recent declines, crime remains a major concern. Law enforcement agencies reported 12.5 million
crimes in 1998, corresponding to roughly 4.6 crimes
reported per 100 residents. Responses collected in the
NCVS show that police reports significantly understate
the level of crime: respondents reported 31 million
crimes in 1998, a rate of 11.5 victimizations per 100
residents.
Society devotes significant resources towm'd preventing crime. In 1997, the criminal justice system had
a budget on the order of $100 billion, almost half being
spent on police, a third on corrections, and the remainder on the judicial system (Freeman 1999). Law
enforcement agencies in the United States employed
0.64 million sworn officers and 0.25 million civilian
employees in 1998. Including civilian employees, the
overall law enforcement employment rate was 3.4
employees per 1,000 residents. In addition to these
public expenditures, significant private resources were
allocated to crime prevention activities; Cunningham,
Strauchs, and Van Meter (1991) reported that private
expenditures exceeded governmental expenditures by
73 percent.
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The combination of both high levels of criminal
activity and high levels of expenditures on crime prevention leads to the question of whether society allocates the optimal level of resources to crime prevention.
Analysis of this question requires estimates of the
social costs of crime that include both direct monetary
losses (lost property or medical bills, for example) and
the cost of victims' pain and suffering, as well as indirect costs. Estimates of the first two components of the
social cost of crime have been made by Perkins et al.
(1996), who used the NCVS to tabulate victims' estimates of the property loss and medical bills associated
with crime, and by Cohen (1988) and Miller, Cohen,
and Rossman (1993), who used jury awards to victims
of crime to measure the costs of victims' pain and suffering. Less is known about the magnitude of the indirect costs of crime.
In this chapter, I focus on one aspect of the indirect
cost of crime: decreases in the earnings of victims of
crime. Psychologists have documented a strong relationship between posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD)
and criminal victimization; they have also noted that
individuals with PTSD suffer from lower employment
rates as a result of the disorder. In addition, behavior
undertaken by the victim to guard against repeat victimization may lead to changes in working patterns and,
subsequently, a reduction in earnings. Victims, for
exmnple, may choose lower-paying jobs in safer neighborhoods, or may withdraw from the labor market
entirely if they feel that work exposes them to sufficiently high levels of risk.
The effect of victimization on the employment status
of victims is estimated using a longitudinal version of
the NCVS that contains data on the employment outcomes and victimization history of a representative
sample of U.S. households. Multiple observations for
each individual allow estimation of models that control
for both observed and unobserved differences between
victims and non-victims of crime. The results suggest
that violent crime victimization is associated with a
transitory decrease in employment rates of between 2
and 3 percent, but that the decline lasts no more than 18
months after the victimization. Results for property
crimes show little effect of victimization on employmentrates.
Focusing solely on employment as a measure of the
labor market consequences of crime may undercount
employment-related costs of crime. For example, in
order to reduce the risk of repeat victimizations, victims
may choose to take lower-paying jobs in safer neighborhoods or in locations closer to home. Similarly, victims
may reduce the number of hours that they work at their
existing job. Neither of these costs are counted by estimates that focus on employment as the outcome of vic-
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tlmlZation. To address this issue, I limit the sample to
heads of households and estimate the effect of victimization on household income. Victims of violent crime
suffer a short-lived decrease in household income of
between 2 and 3 percent, but there is no income loss
associated with property crime victimization.
Estimates of the effect of violent crime on employment and household income can be used to calculate
the average earnings loss of crime victims. Using these
estimates, violent crime is calculated to cost victims an
average of $700 in lost earnings. These estimates of
lost earnings are roughly equal to the direct costs of
injuries and property loss of victimization (Perkins et
al. 1996), suggesting that indirect costs may be an
important component of the social cost of crime. On
the other hand, estimates of lost earnings are significantly less than the pain and suffering costs estimated
by Cohen (1988) and Miller, Cohen, and Rossman
(1993). For violent crime, estimates of pain and suffering costs are more than 10 times the combined cost of
lost or damaged property, medical bills, and lost earnings. The substantial difference between these estimates may be attributed, in part, to selection bias:
violent crimes that lead to civil lawsuits may have
higher costs than the average violent crime. Whatever
the source, the discrepancy suggests that previous estimates of the pain and suffering costs of crime may
overstate the social cost of crime.

Chapter 3
Efficient Bootstrapping for GMM
There are many important applications of generalized method of moments (GMM) estimators for crosssection and panel data. For example, there are a wide
variety of GMM estimators for dynamic panel models.
Also, instrumental vmiables estimators, which m'e also
GMM estimators, are important in the estimation of
treatment effects. It is well known that the usual
asymptotic theory can be a poor approximation to the
distribution of the estimators, particularly when there
are many overidentifying restrictions or when the
parameters of interest are not well identified. The bootstrap provides one approach to improvements in the
approximation; this chapter describes a relatively efficient bootstrap method for GMM in cross-section and
panel data. We show that our method improves on the
standard asymptotic approximation under certain regularity conditions. We also illustrate that the improvement can be large, particularly in dynamic panel data
models, using Monte Carlo simulations and an empirical example.
Hall and Horowitz (1996) previously proposed a
bootstrap for GMM. Their approach is based on center-
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ing the moment conditions in GMM, while ours is
based on bootstrapping the original moment conditions
with an efficient estimator of the distribution. Our
approach has a computational advantage in that the
bootstrap does not require modifying the form of the
estimator. Also, our approach is asymptotically efficient relative to theirs. On the other hand, their
approach has wider applicability than ours does
because they cover dependent data and we do not.
The bootstrap uses an estimate of the distribution of
the data to form an estimate of the distribution of a statistic. Under certain conditions, the improved approximation to the distribution of the statistic can be
expressed in a form similar to an Edgeworth expansion.
These expansions are based on large sample approximations that are of higher order in the sample size than
the usual asymptotic approximation. There are also
other approaches to improvements in approximation,
including those of Bekker (1994) and Staiger and Stock
(1997). Although to date there have been few comparisons ofthese different approaches, the bootstrap
appears to work well in some examples where the
parameters are well identified and there are many overidentifying restrictions.
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